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An Analysis of the Audit Framework 
Focusing on Inherent Risk and 
the Role of Statistical Sampling 
in Compliance Testing 
Donald A. Leslie 
Clarkson Gordon 
Auditors are a loyal brotherhood of arithmetic wizards who when their profession starts to go 
down the pipe . . . band together and disagree with one another. 
with apologies to J. Hart 
The highly competitive professional environment that has developed in the 
U.S. over the past 10 years has spread like a cancer throughout most of the 
world. As a result, meaningful professional standards are currently more 
important to the profession's survival than at any time in its relatively short 
existence. Competition can and should be healthy for a profession, ensuring 
that users of the professional services receive "value for their money" and 
that the profession keeps "abreast of modern technology." Unfortunately, far 
too many users of accounting services are tending to treat them as simple 
commodities that can be purchased like "groceries on a shelf." Some 
observers are of the opinion that "the standard audit is increasingly viewed as 
a simple commodity item" and that "a lot of companies are starting to treat 
their accountants the way they treat their janitorial service."1 Extracts from a 
recent interview with Ralph Walters on the subject of accounting regulation and 
competition in the profession in the U.S. are set out in the Appendix. 
The purpose of this paper is to assist the profession in establishing a 
common audit objective.* In order to ensure that readers do not misinterpret 
my intent, I should make it clear at the outset that I do not believe that it is 
necessary for all auditors to carry out their audits in exactly the same manner in 
similar situations. Rather, it is important that the work that every auditor 
carries out achieves a clearly established and well understood audit objective. 
Specific audit strategies, audit techniques, and levels of staff expertise and 
competence (used to achieve the audit objective) will vary, and it is this 
variation that will provide proper, healthy competition for users of accounting 
and auditing services. 
* Some might argue that current professional pronouncements in Canada and the U.S. provide for 
a common audit framework. Others (myself included) would respond with "current practice 
certainly does not support this view." 
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The Audit Risk Equation 
The heart of the audit objective is the audit risk equation which flows 
directly from the standard auditor's report. "Present fairly" implies that the 
financial statements taken as a whole are not materially misstated while "in our 
opinion" provides the user with the knowledge that there is some (relatively 
small?) risk that the financial statements could contain a material misstatement. 
Over the past few years, the most authoritative risk equation in the audit 
literature (the Appendix to SAS 39—which had its origin in SAP 54) has been 
the subject of critical comments relating to both its validity and its application in 
practice on an increasingly frequent basis.2 
Before analyzing the various risk equations found in the literature, it will be 
useful to establish a standard notation to facilitate comparison. The following 
terms will be used: 
AR—analytical review risk 
DIC—detective internal control risk 
FAR—final audit risk 
IC—internal control risk 
IR—inherent risk 
PIC—preventive internal control risk 
PPE—prior probability of error 
PR—posterior risk 
STD—substantive test of details risk 
FAR is the equivalent of "audit risk" in SAS No. 47 (which replaced "ultimate 
risk" [UR] in SAS No. 39). The most common meaning of "ultimate" is "that 
beyond which there is no other," and this was certainly not the meaning 
intended in SAS 39.** 
The SAS 39 risk equation can be expressed as: 
FAR = IC x AR x STD 
Figure 1 uses a ladder tree diagram to illustrate this equation. Starting at the 
lower left rung, there is a .70 probability that IC will detect a material error and 
a .30 probability that it will not. If the error is not detected by IC, there is a .60 
probability that it will be detected by AR and a .40 probability that it will not be 
detected by AR. Likewise, if it is not detected by AR, there is a .75 probability 
that it will be detected by STD and a .25 that it will not. The right hand column 
sets out the probability of each possible outcome for this model. The FAR (or 
ultimate risk in SAS 39 terminology) would be .03* 
One of the major flaws with this model is that it does not recognize that the 
components of a set of financial statements have different risks because of their 
different inherent natures. SAS 39 addressed the inherent risk with the 
following footnote: 
The risk that monetary errors equal to tolerable error would have 
** Readers may have noticed that SAS 47 does not use the term "tolerable error." It was 
replaced by the expression "errors that could be material, when aggregated with errors in other 
balances or classes, to the financial statements taken as a whole." 
* Although the .05 ultimate risk used in the Appendix to SAS 39 was intended (?) to be illustrative, 
it nonetheless seems to have become a standard. 
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Probability 
of each 
outcome 
1 . 0 0 0 0 
IC Internal Control 
AR Analytical Review 
STD Substantive Tests of Detail 
Figure 1 
occurred in the absence of internal accounting controls related to the 
account balance or class of transactions under audit is difficult and 
potentially costly to quantify. For this reason in this model it is implicitly 
set conservatively at one, although audit experience indicates clearly 
that it is substantially lower. Accordingly, it is not a factor in the 
relationship expressed above. Therefore, the actual risk will ordinarily 
be less than UR. 
It is exceedingly difficult to agree with the above logic as will be 
demonstrated later in this paper. In any event, in SAS 47 the AICPA decided to 
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Ladder Tree Diagram 
Illustrating SAS 39 
Sample Risk Equation 
recognize inherent risk as a full-fledged factor in the risk equation. Its status is 
similar to that of internal control and analytical review in that the auditor can 
"include it if he so desires" by virtue of the statement: 
If an auditor concludes that the effort required to evaluate inherent risk 
for a balance or class would exceed the potential reduction in the extent 
of his auditing procedures derived from reliance on the evaluation, he 
should assess inherent risk as being at the maximum when designing 
auditing procedures. (paragraph 22) 
Thus, the AICPA risk equation now becomes: 
FAR = IR x IC x AR x STD 
Figure 2 illustrates this modified equation in ladder tree diagram form. The 
inherent risk that a material error occurs has been set at .25, and its 
complement, the probability that a material error does not occur, is .75. Note 
the substantial reduction in FAR (or audit risk as used in SAS 47). If the desired 
FAR were .03 as used in Figure 1, the result would be the elimination of STD 
(since IR x IC x AR= .25 x .30 x .40 = .03). Later in the paper, it will be 
demonstrated that a reduction of STD of this magnitude is not justified with this 
IR. 
Cushing and Loebbecke (1983) use this equation as the focal point of their 
critique of the risk analysis model. It is here that they make one of a number of 
critical errors in their paper. They say that this equation is "equivalent to the 
CICA model" in the CICA Extent of Audit Testing (EAT) Study. Had they 
continued reading on the page that contained this model (p. 97), they would 
have learned that this model was not recommended by the Study Group. The 
EAT Study Group recommended the following model: 
FAR= IR x IC x AR x STD 
(IR x IC x AR x STD) + (1 - IR) 
A footnote on page 97 of the EAT Study indicates that further information on 
the approach can be found in Leslie et al, "Dollar-Unit Sampling," page 296. In 
fact, this model is the posterior risk model in Leslie et al (1979). The EAT 
Study Group adopted this model because it "takes the effect of inherent risk 
more accurately into account." Figure 3 uses the details from Figure 2 and 
calculates the "posterior risk." In this instance (highly artificial as will be 
demonstrated later), the difference would appear trivial, although the posterior 
model would not totally eliminate STD. 
It is important to understand the logic applied to Figure 3 to arrive at the 
posterior risk. It is entirely Bayesian, applied in a discrete (and thus artificial) 
manner. If the prior probability of error is .25, then, if the auditor proceeds up 
the steps on the ladder and gets to the end without detecting a material error 
(of course, it would be necessary for him to investigate the findings of 
employees responsible for internal control in order to determine if IC detected 
a material error), he can only be in one of two possible outcomes. Either the 
material error actually occurred (.25 probability), and IC, AR, and STD failed 
to detect it, or the material error never occurred in the first place (.75 
probability). Since preventive internal controls help prevent the error from 
occurring in the first place, it is only logical that they be considered together 
with the inherent risk of error (this will be dealt with in more detail later). 
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Not 
Detected 
Not 
Detected 
Probability 
of each 
outcome 
. 2 5 x . 3 0 x . 4 0 x .25= . 0 0 7 5 
Audit 
Risk 
Detected 
. 2 5 x . 3 0 x . 4 0 x . 7 5 = . 0225 
. 2 5 x . 3 0 x . 6 0 = .0450 
. 2 5 x . 7 0 = .1750 
.7500 
1.0000 
IR Inherent Risk 
IC Internal Control 
AR Analyt ical Review 
STD Substant ive Tes ts of Detail 
Assume for the moment that all internal controls identified were of a detective 
nature and, thus, that the PPE is based entirely on IR. 
While the difference between the SAS 39-47 equation and the posterior 
model was trivial in the illustration in Figure 3, in Figure 4 we see that it can be 
several times the nominal risk. In this illustration, the prior probabilities of a 
material error and no material error are the reverse of those in Figure 3. If the 
proponents of each of these models used an STD of .25 in the situation 
illustrated in Figure 4, their equations would be as follows: 
SAS 39=.30x.40x.25 =.03 
SAS 39-47 =.75 x .30 x .40 x . 25 = .0225 
Posterior = .75 x .30 x .40 x .25 = .0826 
(.75 x .30 x .40 x .25) + (1 - .75) 
93 
Ladder Tree Diagram 
Illustrating SAS 39 - 49 
Simple Risk Equation 
Probability 
of each 
outcome 
However, if they planned to obtain a (final) risk of .03 based on their planning 
models, their equations would appear as follows: 
SAS 39 = .30x.40x.25 =.03 
SAS 39-47 = .75 x .30 x .40 x .333 = .03 
Posterior = .75 x .30 x .40 x .0859 = .03 
(.75 x .30 x .40 x .0859) + (1 - .75) 
What would these different values for STD mean in practice? It is useful to 
compare the difference in sample extents that would result from these STDs. 
Using dollar-unit sampling (zero expected error case) and setting the SAS 39 
sample size equal to " 1 , " we get the following relationship: 
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Ladder Tree Diagram 
Illustrating Posterior 
Risk Equation 
F i g u r e 3 
SAS 39 1.00 
SAS 39-47 .79 
Posterior 1.77 
The most significent conclusion that can be drawn from this comparison is 
that the formal inclusion of IR in SAS 47 will result in an unjustifiable reduction 
in STD. Of course, it can be argued that the model in SAS 39 is simply an 
example and that it is only intended for planning purposes. However, this 
proposition can be countered with the argument that the model used for 
planning should be consistent with the model appropriate for evaluation when 
the audit evidence has been collected. In my opinion, the only appropriate 
conceptual model for audit evaluation is the posterior risk model (with some 
Probability 
of each 
outcome 
F i g u r e 4 
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Ladder Tree Diagram 
Illustrating Risks When 
IR/PPE Is High 
modifications as will be described later) because it relates directly to the 
auditor's objective and the audit opinion. In order to give a clean opinion, the 
auditor must be satisfied that there is a reasonably low risk (.03 in this 
example) that the financial statements do not contain a material error. The two 
AICPA "simple risk models" address this issue only at the planning stage. If 
the auditor does not find a material error, the error is not addressed at the 
evaluation stage, and the audit objective is simply "assumed" to have been 
achieved. It was for this reason that the CICA EAT Study Group adopted the 
posterior model. The Study Group was of the view that the auditor's opinion 
should be based on the evaluation of the risk that the financial statements 
actually contain a material error, given all of the avidence available to the 
auditor, and that this model "takes the effect of inherent risk more accurately 
into account." 
Some members of the AICPA Materiality and Audit Risk Task Force were 
concerned that the inclusion of IR in the risk model would result in a reduction 
of work because an auditor could always "fall back'' to IR "for more assurance 
in highly competitive situations." I certainly share the view of some of my 
fellow Task Force members. However, I believe that auditors must address IR 
when planning and evaluating an audit (and I believe the judiciary would agree 
with my belief). Accordingly, it is even more important that the risk model used 
in practice not deceive the auditor by permitting him to think he is achieving a 
specific audit risk objective when, in fact, he may be incurring a real risk that is 
substantially higher. 
Numerical Illustrations 
Table 1 provides a comparison of the risks generated by the three different 
models based on the risks for IC, AR, and STD in the previous illustrations (the 
first three columns). Column 4 contains the risk objective based on the SAS 39 
model (.03). Column 5 contains various IR/PPE values from .05 to 1.0, and the 
two right-hand columns reflect the risks that would be generated by the SAS 47 
model and the posterior model. These risks have been computed in the manner 
described earlier in this paper (examples §4 and §10 relate to Figures 3 and 4). 
It should be noted that both risks in the final two columns are less than the 
SAS 39 risk until the PPE exceeds .50 (actually slightly over .50). Above a 
PPE of .50, the SAS 47 risk continues to increase until it reaches its maximum 
of .03 when the PPE is 1.0. It is then equal to the SAS 39 risk, demonstrating 
in theory, the comment in the footnote to the Appendix of SAS 39 that "the 
actual risk will ordinarily be less than UR." Clearly, the word "ordinarily" 
should be interpreted to mean situations where the PPE does not exceed .50. 
Perhaps this limitation is what the authors of SAS 39 had in mind when it was 
drafted. I would suggest, however, that this qualification is not being observed 
in practice. 
Note that when the PPE is 1.0, the actual (posterior) risk is also 1.0, as is 
only logical because a PPE of 1.0 means that the auditor has "perfect" 
knowledge that a material error exists and, thus cannot believe the results of 
the audit if the error has not been detected. (Obviously, the auditor rarely has 
such "perfect" knowledge that a material error exists. Likewise, there rarely 
is "perfect" knowledge that a material error does not exist—a PPE of 0.) 
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Whereas SAS 39 "conservatively" set IR equal to 1, SAS 47 uses the term 
"maximum" to "solve" this problem.3 Unfortunately, this change will 
probably not be noticed by most readers of SAS 47, and it is likely to be 
obscure to those who do recognize it. 
Table 2 contains some comparisons of these three models based on the IC 
and AR values used in Table 2 of the Appendix to SAS 39. Here, the .05 risk 
objective used in SAS 39 has also been used. For the first eleven examples, IR/ 
PPE has been set at .50 (often referred to as the equivalent of a uniform prior). 
The STD risk for SAS 39 and the posterior model are basically identical. 
Logically (from an arithmetic point of view), the SAS 47 allowable risk is double 
the risk of the other two. 
COMPARISON OF TESTING RISK LEVELS REQUIRED 
SUBSTANTIVE TEST OF DETAILS 
RISK REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE A .05 
SAS 39 ; SAS 47 LESLIE 
EX. INHERENT INTERNAL ANALYTICAL "ULTIMATE" AUDIT POSTERIOR 
# RISK CONTROL REVIEW RISK RISK RISK 
1 0.5000 0.1000 1.0000 0.5000 NTR 0.5260 
2 0.5000 0.3000 1.0000 0.1667 0 . 3 3 3 3 0.1753 
3 0.5000 0.3000 0 . 5 0 0 0 0 . 3 3 3 3 0.6667 0.3510 
4 0.5000 0.3000 0.3000 0 . 5 5 5 6 NTR 0.5850 
5 0.5000 0.5000 1.0000 0.1000 0.2000 0.1052 
6 0 . 5 0 0 0 0.5000 0 . 5 0 0 0 0 . 2 0 0 0 0.4000 0 . 2 1 0 5 
7 0.5000 0.5000 0.3000 0 . 3 3 3 3 0.6667 0.3510 
8 0.5000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0500 0.1000 0.0526 
9 0.5000 1.0000 0.5000 0.1000 0.2000 0.1053 
10 0.5000 1.0000 0.3000 0 . 1 6 6 7 0 . 3 3 3 3 0.1753 
11 0.5000 1.0000 0.1000 0.5000 NTR 0.5260 
12 0 . 2 5 0 0 0.1000 1.0000 0 . 5 0 0 0 NTR NTR 
13 0.2500 0.3000 1.0000 0 . 1 6 6 7 0.6667 0.5260 
14 0.2500 0.3000 0.5000 0 . 3 3 3 3 NTR NTR 
15 0 . 2 5 0 0 0.3000 0.3000 0.5556 NTR NTR 
16 0.2500 0.5000 1.0000 0.1000 0.4000 0.3160 
17 0.2500 0.5000 0.5000 0.2000 0.8000 0.6320 
18 0.2500 0.5000 0.3000 0 . 3 3 3 3 NTR NTR 
19 0.2500 1.0000 1.0000 0.0500 0.2000 0.1580 
20 0.2500 1.0000 0.5000 0.1000 0.4000 0.3160 
21 0.2500 1.0000 0.3000 0.1667 0.6667 0.5260 
22 0.2500 1.0000 0.1000 0.5000 NTR NTR 
NTR = NO TEST REQUIRED 
INTERNAL CONTROL AND ANALYTICAL REVIEW 
FACTORS FROM TABLE 2 , APPENDIX, SAS 39 
TABLE 2 
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The bottom eleven examples are based on an IR/PPE set equal to .25 (a 
favourable prior). In these cases, the SAS 47 allowable STD risk is four times 
the allowable SAS 39 STD risk. On the other hand, the allowable STD risk for 
the posterior model is slightly more than three times the SAS 39 allowable STD 
risk. 
Table 3 contains some additional comparisons where the IR/PPE is 
unfavourable (.75 and .90). These comparisons have been made via the dollar-
unit sampling extent that would be used if no errors were expected.* The SAS 
* Given these priors an auditor would be foolish to use what is termed a "discovery sample" 
(designed to accept only when no errors are found). However, it is the most convenient case to 
use. For sample sizes designed to accept errors without breaching the materiality limit, the 
differences in extents would be somewhat less. 
COMPARISON OF DUS EXTENTS - HIGH PRIOR PROBABILITY OF ERROR 
RATIO OF DOLLAR-UNIT SAMPLE SIZES 
SAS 47 POSTERIOR POSTERIOR 
EX. INHERENT INTERNAL ANALYTICAL TO TO TO 
# RISK/PPE CONTROL REVIEW SAS 39 SAS 39 SAS 47 
• 
1 0.7500 0.1000 1.0000 0.5850 2.5121 4.2945 
2 0.7500 0.3000 1.0000 0.8394 1.5843 1.8874 
3 0.7500 0.3000 0.5000 0.7381 1.9530 2.6458 
4 0.7500 0.3000 0.3000 0.5106 2.7812 5.4473 
5 0.7500 0.5000 1.0000 0.8751 1.4547 1.6624 
6 0.7500 0.5000 0.5000 0.8213 1.6505 2.0098 
7 0.7500 0.5000 0.3000 0.7381 1.9530 2.6458 
8 0.7500 1.0000 1.0000 0.9040 1.3495 1.4928 
9 0.7500 1.0000 0.5000 0.8751 1.4547 1.6624 
10 0.7500 1.0000 0.3000 0.8394 1.5843 1.8874 
11 0.7500 1.0000 0.1000 0.5850 2.5121 4.2945 
12 0.9000 0.1000 1.0000 0.8480 4.0954 4.8295 
13 0.9000 0.3000 1.0000 0.9412 2.1975 2.3348 
14 0.9000 0.3000 0.5000 0.9041 2.9530 3.2662 
15 0.9000 0.3000 0.3000 0.8208 4.6503 5.6659 
16 0.9000 0.5000 1.0000 0.9542 1.9318 2.0244 
17 0.9000 0.5000 0.5000 0.9345 2.3331 2.4966 
18 0.9000 0.5000 0.3000 0.9041 2.9530 3.2662 
19 0.9000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9648 1.7162 1.7788 
20 0.9000 1.0000 0.5000 0.9542 1.9318 2.0244 
21 0.9000 1.0000 0.3000 0.9412 2.1975 2.3348 
22 0.9000 1.0000 0.1000 0.8480 4.0954 4.8295 
INTERNAL CONTROL AND ANALYTICAL REVIEW 
FACTORS FROM TABLE 2, APPENDIX, SAS 39 
TABLE 3 
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39 sample size has been set equal to " 1 " for these comparisons. In all cases, 
the SAS 47 sample size is less than the SAS 39 sample size. The sample sizes 
produced by the posterior model are much larger than both the SAS 39 and 
SAS 47 sample sizes. 
With respect to the reflection of IR in the audit process, these illustrations 
demonstrate that SAS 47 can actually be a retrogressive step if an appropriate 
risk model is not employed. It gives too much weight to favourable priors, and 
it dangerously ignores those that are unfavourable. On the other hand, SAS 39 
ignores the priors entirely, resulting in overauditing when they are favourable 
and underauditing when they are unfavourable. It might be tempting to argue 
that the situation more than "averages out'' for SAS 39 since far fewer than 50 
percent of all audits would have a PPE greater than .50 (and thus overauditing 
is more frequent than underauditing). Would such a defense be acceptable in 
court? Would users of financial statements who have suffered losses as a result 
of inadequate audit extents be happy with such an answer? Losses are certainly 
not "averaged out'' over all the clients of an auditor when they are discovered. 
Prior Probability of Error—Inherent Risk 
and Preventive Internal Controls 
Cushing and Loebbecke (1983) express serious concerns about the 
independence of the factors in the risk model. As a solution, they suggest (page 
29): 
A more reasonable approach might be to define inherent risk as 
conditional upon the quality of the internal control system. Mathe­
matically speaking, this is the correct way to formulate the model. It is 
also consistent with the frequent audit practice of identifying "special 
risks" or "sensitive areas" during audit planning. However, neither 
the AICPA nor CICA model suggests or implies such an approach. 
I noted earlier that what they referred to as the CICA model is, in fact, the 
AICPA post SAS 47 model. I would strongly submit that the CICA model (and, 
obviously, the Leslie et al model on which it was based) adequately addresses 
this issue. Leslie et al (1979, p. 307) stated: 
Of particular relevance to the auditor is the distinction between 
preventive controls and detective controls. Preventive controls seek to 
prevent the occurrence of errors or irregularities—or, more accurately, 
to reduce their chance of occurrence. Detective controls seek to detect 
such errors or irregularities as do occur—or, more accurately, to 
increase their chance of detection. Usually, both types of control are 
desirable. The need for controls of a preventive nature is less, the 
greater the inherent insusceptibility to material error. Most auditors 
assess the prior probabilities of an error occurring in the first place after 
considering the nature and effectiveness of preventive controls. 
The Cushing and Loebbecke article leads directly to the conclusion that IR 
should be considered "high" if IC is "high." I believe that this is a myth that 
should be dispelled. An example will illustrate my point: 
Consider the inventories of two different types of business. Firm A is a 
large financial institution that holds billions of dollars worth of marketa­
ble securities for its own account and as custodian for customers. Firm 
B makes steel reinforced concrete supports for expressway construc-
100 
tion (minimum weight of two tons). An auditor would be very concerned 
if Firm A did not have a well designed system of preventive controls (an 
appropriate class of vault, armed guards, controlled securities cage, 
segregation of duties relating to the recording and custody functions, a 
record of certificate numbers, registration of certificates, use of jumbo 
certificates [for example, where the holding of Ford Motor Company 
stock had not dropped below 900,000 shares for a considerable period, 
one share certificate for 900,000 shares would be obtained from the 
transfer agent rendering the certificate virtually impossible to dispose of 
if stolen or lost], etc.). We know that if Firm A were to leave these 
securities sitting on tables in the general office with no such controls, 
they would disappear rapidly. Firm B, on the other hand, would waste 
money if it fenced the yard, installed an alarm system, hired armed 
guards with attack dogs, etc. 
Many more examples of contrasting situations of this nature can be cited, 
and I am sure that practitioners will find that many come to mind rather quickly. 
Thus, if auditors automatically consider IR to be high when IC is high, they are 
virtually certain to overaudit in a high proportion of cases. Further, to make 
recommendations for preventive control improvements when IR is low (and, 
thus, potential benefits are limited) could cause clients to question an auditor's 
understanding of the purpose of internal control. Management generally seeks 
some constant low risk of errors occurring, and its decision on the implementa­
tion of preventive controls will be strongly influenced by the inherent risk of 
error in the first place. K.P. Johnson (1981) made some useful comments on 
assessing risks that warrant repeating here. 
Before a system of internal control can be designed, or an existing 
system evaluated, management must know something about the kinds 
of business and transaction risks that exist in its particular organization, 
assess their significance, and determine which ones cannot be avoided. 
Only then can controls be designed to reduce the remaining risks to 
those that are consciously acceptable to management and are at a level 
that management has consciously determined. 
Internal controls should not be confused with, or limited to, the 
accounting system. While an accounting system is a necessary element 
of a system of internal control, the control system is much larger in 
scope. A good system of internal control contains elements that have 
little or no relationship to accounting activities. For example, require­
ments for advance approval of transactions and restrictions on physical 
access to assets are examples of internal controls that reduce the risk of 
errors; they also operate outside of the accounting system. Internal 
controls are introduced into the accounting system and into other 
aspects of enterprise operations to prevent errors from occurring in the 
first place, and to detect them on a timely basis if they do occur. 
It is important that the inherent risk judgments be made separately for each 
financial statement assertion. The illustration above involved the existence 
assertion. With respect to the valuation assertion, the inherent risk assess­
ment could be just the opposite. For example, the market values for securities 
are readily available from reputable independent pricing services. On the other 
hand, the steel reinforced structures could involve very complex pricing since 
many consist of special high-strength steel rods. The steel is purchased from a 
German mill in units of 1,000 kilograms, and the purchase invoice is in 
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Deutsche marks. To arrive at a cost, it is necessary to convert steel rod 
measurements for length and diameter to pounds, and then to kilograms. It is 
then necessary to apply a price per kilogram based on a conversion of Deutsche 
marks to dollars with the addition of freight and duty—a far more complex 
calculation than the pricing of securities based on an independent pricing 
service. The auditor, therefore, would assess the inherent risk for the 
valuation assertion as high and would try to identify controls that reduce that 
risk. 
Figure 5 is an illustration of how an auditor could go about making an 
assessment of the PPE. If he were a "quanto," he would make the 
assessment in numerical terms by stating a probability. If he were a "judgo," 
he would make the assessment in nonquantitative terms4 such as high, 
moderate, or low. In examples A, B, and C, the IR is high, and he would look 
for preventive controls to mitigate the risk. In example A, the preventive 
controls are excellent (such as those described for the financial institution 
above), and he concludes that the PPE is low. In example B, the PICs are good 
(rather than excellent), and he makes an assessment of the PPE as moderate. 
In example C, there are no PICs (or any that exist are evaluated as ineffective), 
and, thus, he assesses the PPE as high. The same logic applies to examples D 
to I. In examples G and H, it should be noted that there is no apparent payback 
for identifying PICs. These two examples demonstrate that the auditor is 
cognizant of the risk of "double counting."* For example, G would be similar 
to Firm B (in the earlier example) fencing its storage yard, installing an alarm 
system, hiring armed guards with attack dogs, etc. Any reduction of an already 
low risk would be so trivial that it would not be sensible to give any credit for it. 
In example D, only partial credit is given since excellent PICs would not 
improve the situation beyond a low PPE. The additive illustration in Figure 5 is 
not intended to imply that the associated probabilities are additive but, rather, 
that the auditor's knowledge of these two components is additive. 
This figure can also illustrate why the auditor must work harder when there 
is a high PPE. Consider examples A and C. Suppose that in each of these 
examples the risks for DIC, AR, and STD are identical and neither auditor finds 
a material error during the audit. Logically, the auditor in example A should be 
able to sleep well at night because his sample confirmed his prior belief. 
However, the auditor in example C should have trouble sleeping at night. His 
sample did not find evidence that supported his prior belief—that a material 
error more than likely existed. The posterior model would require more 
evidence (from one or all of DIC, AR, and STD) to be obtained in example C 
than both of the AICPA models. More evidence is required to obtain a "not 
guilty" verdict when there is prima facie evidence of a crime than when it is 
highly likely that a crime was not committed in the first place. 
* Cushing and Loebbecke expressed concern over the independence of the component risks. 
Making the PPE assessment in this manner provides protection against this potential problem. 
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INHERENT RISK + PREVENTIVE CONTROLS 
= PRIOR PROBABILITY OF ERROR 
Auditor's Assessment of 
Example Inherent Risk 
Pre­
ventive [=] 
Controls 
Prior 
Probability 
of 
Error 
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Figure 5 
Have We Now Identified the Theoretically 
Correct Audit Risk Model? 
I have a great subject [statistics] to write upon, but feel keenly my literary incapacity to make 
it easily intelligible without sacrificing accuracy and thoroughness. 
Sir Francis Galton 
Unfortunately, we have not. Cushing and Loebbecke (page 27), in criticiz­
ing the SAS 47 model (which they mistakenly identified as the CICA model) 
made some valid observations about discrete models of the type we have been 
dealing with to this point.* 
Models such as this are abstractions of reality. They are used to gain a 
better understanding of reality and to make reasonably reliable and 
useful predictions. However, they are always simplified; i.e., all aspects 
of reality can rarely if ever be accurately incorporated into a model. This 
simplification is appropriate as long as it is not overdone or done 
improperly. The measure of this would be whether the model caused 
the user to misunderstand the reality being represented, or to use the 
model unwittingly to make unreliable predictions. 
After a discussion of these simple joint risk models, Leslie et al (p. 304) 
described the oversimplification as follows: 
The joint risk model discussed is an oversimplification because it 
assumes that there is only one discrete risk, namely, the risk of a 
material error. In fact, there should be a continuous distribution of 
probabilities of occurrence (and detection) of errors aggregating various 
amounts. . . . 
The audit can be described as a continuous process. In theory, the auditor 
commences this process with a continuous distribution representing the prior 
probability of error based on his assessment of inherent risk and preventive 
controls. As each piece of evidence is obtained the auditor revises this 
distribution. If the evidence is favourable, the peak of the curve will move away 
from materiality, and the area of the curve beyond materiality will diminish. 
Conversely, if a piece of evidence is unfavourable, the peak will move toward 
materiality, and more of the area will be beyond that point. When all 
procedures have been completed, the final (posterior) distribution is the basis 
for the opinion given on the financial statements. If the distribution peaks well 
to the left of materiality with only a small portion in the right tail, an unqualified 
opinion would be warranted. If the distribution peaks to the right of materiality 
(most likely error exceeds materiality), a qualified opinion would usually be 
warranted. If the distribution peaks to the left of materiality but the area to the 
right of materiality is too large, then the risk would be too high to warrant an 
unqualified opinion even though a material error would not be likely. The 
auditor would not have obtained "reasonable assurance" that a material error 
did not exist. 
In the past, the theoretically correct model has been virtually impossible to 
use in practice. Now, with the increasing use of computerized audit decision 
* It should, however, be noted that their concerns are considerably different than mine. Their 
paper proposes a model that lacks the same reality that causes their criticism of the post SAS 47 
model. 
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aids, it is becoming increasingly more feasible. It is not difficult to predict that 
within the foreseeable future such complex models will be an integral part of 
the audit. In the process of describing the theoretically correct model, I will 
avoid the use of calculus and continuous distributions* by chopping up such 
distributions into smaller pieces for use in an extended discrete posterior risk 
model that behaves like the "real thing." 
As noted above, one of the deficiencies with the discrete model is that it 
loads all of the prior distribution on two points—zero error and exactly a 
material error. In the real world, the prior distribution will extend from at or 
near zero to some amount beyond materiality (since there is no known natural 
law preventing errors from being greater than materiality). Table 4 contains an 
illustration of a model with a uniform prior error distribution. In the far left 
column, all possible population error rates are listed in .01 intervals (.00 to 
.99—although .34 to .99 have been omitted). The prior probability of each of 
these possible error rates is shown in column 2. This is the "no knowledge" 
case where every possible error rate is equally probable (a .01 probability for 
each). Column 3 contains the probability of finding "0" errors in a sample of 
100 if the corresponding error rate in column 1 really exists. For example, if a 
.01 error really did exist, the probability of obtaining 0 errors in a sample of 100 
would be .36603.** Since the possible population error rate of .01 would (given 
this uniform prior) only occur with a frequency of .01, the product of columns 2 
and 3 represents the frequency of 0 error samples from this particular 
underlying error rate. The aggregate of all such values in column 4 represents 
all possible samples that contain 0 errors. 
Column 2 illustrates how quickly the probability of obtaining 0 errors in a 
sample of 100 approaches 0. By the time the possible error rate has reached 
.12, the probability of obtaining 0 errors in a sample of 100 has declined to less 
than .000003. For this reason, it was not necessary to include the remainder of 
the distribution since all values in columns 3 to 6 are 0. This aspect also 
resolves another apparent inconsistency with a uniform distribution. While it is 
equated to the "no knowledge" state, if materiality were .03, we would have 
.03 distributed below materiality and .97 above. In other words, the prior 
probability of an error equal to or greater than materiality would aggregate .97. 
Since possible population error rates beyond .03 have a diminishing impact on 
the model, they do not create a problem. 
Since column 4 contains all of the possible 0 error samples of 100 that could 
be produced by this underlying uniform error distribution, when we obtain one 
of them, we know that it must be one of those in this column. Thus, in column 5 
we determine the relative frequency of each of the values in column 4 (each 
value divided by the total of column 4). Column 6 contains the values in column 
5 "summed-up." If our sample must be one of these (since we found 0 errors) 
and we are concerned about an error rate of .03 or greater (the materiality 
level), we can see that the probability (posterior risk) that our sample comes 
* It is not as a consideration of readers that I avoid the use of calculus to deal with this issue. 
Rather, it is the fact that I have never taken calculus that forces this approach. 
** All calculations are based on the binomial distribution. Although 5 digits to the right of the 
decimal are shown in the tables, Microsoft's Multiplan manual for the Apple Macintosh indicates 
that internal calculations are carried out using 14 digits. 
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EXAMPLE OF POSTERIOR RISK - UNIFORM PRIOR ERROR 
Prior Relative Posterior 
Possible Probability Probability Frequency Risk 
Population Of Error Of 0 Error Column 2 Of Prob. ( o f error 
Error Rate In In Sample X In rate t h a n 
Rates Column 1 Of 100 Column 3 Column 4 Column 1) 
0.000 0.010 1.00000 0.01000 0.63609 1.00000 
0.010 0.010 0.36603 0.00366 0.23283 0.36391 
0.020 0.010 0.13262 0.00133 0.08436 0.13109 
0.030 0.010 0.04755 0.00048 0.03025 0.04673 
0.040 0.010 0.01687 0.00017 0.01073 0.01648 
0.050 0.010 0.00592 0.00006 0.00377 0.00575 
0.060 0.010 0.00205 0.00002 0.00131 0.00198 
0.070 0.010 0.00071 0.00001 0.00045 i 0.00068 
0.080 0.010 0.00024 0.00000 0.00015 0.00023 
0 .090 0.010 0.00008 0.00000 0.00005 0.00008 
0.100 0.010 0.00003 0.00000 0.00002 0.00003 
0.110 0.010 0.00001 0.00000 0.00001 i 0.00001 
0.120 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.130 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.140 i 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.150 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.160 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.170 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.180 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.190 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.200 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.210 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.220 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.230 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.240 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.250 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.260 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.270 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.280 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.290 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.300 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.310 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.320 i 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.330 0.010 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
TABLE 4 
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from a population with an underlying error rate of .03 or more is .04673. This is 
virtually identical to the classical (i.e., non-Bayesian) sampling risk for a sample 
of 100 and a .03 population error rate (which is .04755 as shown in column 3). 
If our sample of 100 had contained, say, 1 error, the probability in column 3 
would have been computed for 1 error instead of 0 errors. All other calculations 
would remain the same. We make this calculation for the exact number of 
errors we find, ignoring all of the other error cases because we know we 
cannot be in any of them. 
Table 5 (in 3 parts) contains a complete example of a uniform prior. In this 
instance, the possible population error rates have been limited to a narrower 
range (0 to .099, in 100 increments of .001). This is probably a closer 
resemblance to a "no knowledge" distribution for an audit (0 to 3.3 times 
materiality rather than 0 to 33 times materiality). At the .03 possible error rate 
at the bottom of part 1, it can be seen that the posterior risk of this much error 
(or more) is still equivalent to the classical sampling risk. 
The subsequent posterior risk tables are all based on a sample of 115 to 
facilitate a comparison with Figures 1 to 4. If a .03 error existed, the probability 
of a sample of 115 containing 0 errors would also be .03.* Thus, a sample of 
115 will yield the same risk as the product of IC, AR, and STD in Figures 1 to 4 
(.30 x.40 x .25 = .03). 
The illustration at the top of Table 6 represents the 50/50 distribution for a 
discrete model (the equivalent of the uniform priors in Tables 4 and 5).** At 
the material error value (.03001), the classical sampling probability and the 
posterior risk are virtually equal (.03008 and .02920). The SAS 39 model would 
imply a risk of .03, the SAS 47 model would imply a risk of .015, and the simple 
discrete posterior model would indicate .0291 (see Table 1). However, if the 
prior is stacked 50/50 at $1 over and $1 under materiality, the posterior risk 
rises to virtually .50 as illustrated at the bottom of Table 6. The illustration at 
the top of Table 7 spreads the .5 portion of the prior below materiality in a level 
or uniform manner, but stacks the .5 above, right at materiality. In this case, 
the posterior risk rises to .08347 or almost three times the stated risks for the 
discrete posterior model and the SAS 39 model. It is almost six times the 
stated risk for the SAS 47 model. This result is due to the fact that the simple 
discrete models ignore reality when they stack the priors on 0 errors and a 
material error. Of course, these last two illustrations are not realistic either. 
The illustration at the bottom of Table 7 reflects the circumstances in 
Figure 3. This condition results in the same posterior risk of .0099. The 
circumstances in Figure 4 are reflected in the illustration at the top of Table 8, 
and once more the results are in agreement. But neither of these two 
illustrations can be considered to represent reality. The illustration at the 
bottom of Table 8 contains the same prior as the illustration at the top, but in 
* Readers should ensure that they do not confuse the two .03 values. One is a risk; the other is the 
materiality level selected for purposes of the illustration. The fact that they are the same in this 
illustration is entirely coincidental. 
** If $30,000 is the materiality level, does this mean that an amount greater than $30,000 ($30,001 
and above) would be material, or does it mean $30,000 and above? To avoid splitting hairs, I have 
loaded the portion of the distribution applicable to a material error at or above .03001 and the 
portion applicable to less than a material error at or below .02999. 
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EXAMPLE OF POSTERIOR RISK - LIMITED UNIFORM PRIOR ERROR 
Prior Relative Posterior 
Possible Probability Probability Frequency Risk 
Population: Of Error Of 0 Error Column 2 Of Prob. (of error 
Error Rate In In Sample X In rate x than 
Rates Column 1 Of 100 Column 3 Column 4 Column 1) 
0.000 0.010 1.00000 0.01000 0.09607 1.00000 
0.001 0.010 0.90479 0.00905 0.08692 0.90393 
0.002 0.010 0.81857 0.00819 0.07864 0.81701 
0.003 0.010 0.74048 0.00740 0.07114 0.73837 
0.004 0.010 0.66978 0.00670 0.06435 0.66723 
0.005 0.010 0.60577 0.00606 0.05820 0.60288 
0.006 0.010 0.54782 0.00548 0.05263 0.54469 
0.007 0.010 0.49536 0.00495 0.04759 0.49206 
0.008 0.010 0.44789 0.00448 0.04303 0.44447 
0.009 0.010 0.40492 0.00405 0.03890 0.40144 
0.010 0.010 0.36603 0.00366 0.03516 0.36254 
0.011 0.010 0.33085 0.00331 0.03178 0.32737 
0.012 0.010 0.29902 0.00299 0.02873 0.29559 
0.013 0.010 0.27022 0.00270 0.02596 0.26686 
0.014 0.010 0.24417 0.00244 0.02346 0.24090 
0.015 0.010 0.22061 0.00221 0.02119 0.21745 
0.016 0.010 0.19930 0.00199 0.01915 0.19625 
0.017 0.010 0.18003 0.00180 0.01730 0.17710 
0.018 0.010 0.16261 0.00163 0.01562 0.15981 
0.019 0.010 0.14686 0.00147 0.01411 0.14419 
0.020 0.010 0.13262 0.00133 0.01274 0.13008 
0.021 0.010 0.11975 0.00120 0.01150 0.11734 
0.022 0.010 0.10811 0.00108 0.01039 0.10583 
0.023 0.010 0.09760 0.00098 0.00938 0.09545 
0.024 0.010 0.08810 0.00088 0.00846 0.08607 
0.025 0.010 0.07952 0.00080 0.00764 0.07761 
0.026 0 . 0 1 0 i 0.07176 0.00072 0.00689 0.06997 
0.027 0.010 0.06476 0.00065 0.00622 0.06307 
0.028 0.010 0.05843 0.00058 0.00561 0.05685 
0.029 0.010 0.05271 0.00053 0.00506 0.05124 
0.030 0.010 0.04755 0.00048 0.00457 0.04617 
0.031 0.010 0.04289 0.00043 0.00412 0.04161 
0.032 0.010 0.03868 0.00039 0.00372 0.03748 
0.033 0.010 0.03489 0.00035 0.00335 0.03377 
TABLE 5 - PART 1 
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E X A M P L E OF POSTERIOR RISK - LIMITED UNIFORM PRIOR ERROR 
0.034 0.010 0.03146 0.00031 0.00302 0.03042 
0.035 0.010 0.02836 0.00028 0.00272 0.02739 
0.036 0.010 0.02557 0.00026 0.00246 0.02467 
0.037 0.010 0.02305 0.00023 0.00221 0.02221 
0.038 0.010 0.02077 0.00021 0.00200 0.02000 
0.039 0.010 0.01872 0.00019 0.00180 0.01800 
0.040 0.010 0.01687 0.00017 0.00162 0.01621 
0.041 0.010 0.01520 0.00015 0.00146 0.01458 
0.042 0.010 0.01369 0.00014 0.00132 0.01312 
0.043 0.010 0.01234 0.00012 0.00119 i 0.01181 
0.044 0.010 0.01111 0.00011 0.00107 i 0.01062 
0.045 0.010 0.01001 0.00010 0.00096 0.00956 
0.046 0.010 0.00901 0.00009 0.00087 0.00859 
0.047 0.010 0.00812 0.00008 0.00078 0.00773 
0.048 0.010 0.00731 0.00007 0.00070 0.00695 
0.049 0.010 0.00658 0.00007 0.00063 0.00625 
0.050 0.010 0.00592 0.00006 0.00057 0.00562 
0.051 0.010 0.00533 0.00005 0.00051 0 .00505 
0.052 0.010 0.00480 0.00005 0.00046 0.00453 
0.053 0.010 i 0.00432 0.00004 0.00041 i 0.00407 
0.054 0.010 0.00388 0.00004 0.00037 0.00366 
0.055 0.010 0.00349 0.00003 0.00034 0.00329 
0.056 0.010 0.00314 0.00003 0.00030 0.00295 
0.057 0.010 0.00283 0.00003 0.00027 0.00265 
0.058 0.010 0.00254 0.00003 0.00024 0.00238 
0.059 0.010 0.00229 i 0.00002 0.00022 0.00213 
0.060 0.010 0.00205 0.00002 0.00020 i 0.00191 
0.061 0.010 0.00185 0.00002 0.00018 0.00172 
0.062 0.010 0.00166 0.00002 0.00016 0.00154 
0.063 0.010 i 0.00149 0.00001 0.00014 0.00138 
0.064 0.010 0.00134 0.00001 0.00013 0.00124 
0.065 0.010 0.00121 0.00001 0.00012 i 0.00111 
0.066 0.010 0.00108 0.00001 0.00010 0.00099 
0.067 0.010 0.00097 0.00001 0.00009 0.00089 
0.068 0.010 0.00087 0.00001 0.00008 0.00079 
0.069 0.010 0.00079 0.00001 0.00008 0.00071 
0.070 0.010 0.00071 0.00001 0.00007 0.00063 
0.071 0.010 0.00063 0.00001 0.00006 0.00057 
0.072 0.010 0.00057 0.00001 0 .00005 i 0.00051 
0.073 0.010 0.00051 0.00001 0 .00005 i 0.00045 
T A B L E 5 - PART 2 
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0 . 0 7 4 0.010 0 . 0 0 0 4 6 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.00004 0 . 0 0 0 4 0 
0 . 0 7 5 0.010 0.00041 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.00004 0 . 0 0 0 3 6 
0 . 0 7 6 0.010 0.00037 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 4 0 . 0 0 0 3 2 
0 . 0 7 7 0.010 0 . 0 0 0 3 3 0.00000 0.00003 0 . 0 0 0 2 8 
0 . 0 7 8 0.010 0.00030 0.00000 0.00003 0 . 0 0 0 2 5 
0.079 0.010 0.00027 0.00000 0.00003 0.00022 
0 . 0 8 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 2 4 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.00002 0.00020 
0.081 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 2 1 0.00000 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 1 7 
0 . 0 8 2 0.010 0 . 0 0 0 1 9 0.00000 0.00002 0 . 0 0 0 1 5 
0 . 0 8 3 0.010 0 . 0 0 0 1 7 0.00000 0.00002 0 . 0 0 0 1 3 
0 . 0 8 4 0.010 0 . 0 0 0 1 5 0.00000 0.00001 0 . 0 0 0 1 2 
0 . 0 8 5 0.010 0.00014 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 
0 . 0 8 6 0.010 0.00012 0.00000 0.00001 0 . 0 0 0 0 9 
0 . 0 8 7 0.010 0.00011 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.00001 0 . 0 0 0 0 8 
0 . 0 8 8 0.010 0.00010 0.00000 0.00001 0 . 0 0 0 0 7 
0 . 0 8 9 0.010 0 . 0 0 0 0 9 0.00000 0.00001 0 . 0 0 0 0 6 
0.090 0.010 0.00008 0.00000 0.00001 0 . 0 0 0 0 5 
0.091 0.010 0.00007 0.00000 0.00001 0 . 0 0 0 0 4 
0 . 0 9 2 0.010 0 . 0 0 0 0 6 0.00000 0.00001 0 . 0 0 0 0 3 
0 . 0 9 3 0.010 0.00006 0.00000 0.00001 0 . 0 0 0 0 3 
0 . 0 9 4 0.010 0 . 0 0 0 0 5 0.00000 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 
0 . 0 9 5 0.010 0 . 0 0 0 0 5 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.00000 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 
0.096 0.010 0.00004 0.00000 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.00001 
0 . 0 9 7 0.010 0.00004 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.00000 0.00001 
0 . 0 9 8 0.010 0 . 0 0 0 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.00000 0.00001 
0 . 0 9 9 0.010 0.00003 0.00000 0.00000 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 
1.000 1 0 . 4 0 9 0 7 0 . 1 0 4 0 9 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 
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POSTERIOR RISK - 50/50 PRIOR [STACKED ON ZERO AND MATERIALITY] 
Prior Relative Posterior 
Possible Probability Probability Frequency Risk 
Population Of Error Of 0 Error Column 2 Of Prob. (of error 
Error Rate In In Sample X In rate than 
Rates Column 1 Of 115 Column 3 Column 4 Column 1) 
0.00000 0.50000 1.00000 0.50000 0.97080 1.00000 
0.03001 0.50000 0.03008 0.01504 0.02920 0.02920 
POSTERIOR RISK - 50/50 PRIOR [STACKED AT MATERIALITY] 
Prior Relative Posterior 
Possible Probability Probability Frequency Risk 
Population Of Error Of 0 Error Column 2 Of Prob. (of error 
Error Rate In In Sample X In rate than 
Rates Column 1 Of 115 Column 3 Column 4 Column 1) 
0.02999 0.50000 0.03015 0.01507 0.50059 1.00000 
0.03001 0.50000 0.03008 6.01504 0.49941 0.49941 
TABLE 6 
this instance the spread is somewhat realistic (0 to .054, peaking at mate­
riality). This produces a posterior risk of .24640 in comparison with the simple 
posterior risk of .08276, the SAS 39 risk of .03, and the SAS 47 risk of .0225 
(see example §10 in Table 1). 
The illustration at the top of Table 9 spreads the 75/25 prior in a similar 
manner (0 and .04 peaking at materiality). Here we see a true posterior risk of 
.04301 in comparison with the simple posterior risk of .0099, the SAS 39 risk of 
.03, and the SAS 47 risk of .0075 (see example §4 in Table 1). The illustration 
at the bottom of Table 9 spreads the 75/25 prior again but with a lower peak (0 
to .05, peaking at .015, which is 50 percent of materiality). The true posterior 
risk dropped to .01693, and, of course, the three simple risk model results do 
not change. 
We have seen that the simplistic risk models can significantly understate 
the auditor's risk when he is giving a clean opinion. The SAS 39 model totally 
ignores IR/PPE. The SAS 47 model gives too much credit to inherent risk 
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POSTERIOR RISK - 50/50 PRIOR [LEVEL BELOW MATERIALITY] 
Prior Relative Posterior 
Possible Probability Probability Frequency Risk 
Population Of Error Of 0 Error Column 2 Of Prob. (of error 
Error Rate In In Sample X In rate than 
Rates Column 1 of 115 Column 3 Column 4 Column 1) 
0.00000 0.05000 1.00000 0.05000 0.27754 1.00000 
0.00300 0.05000 0.70785 0.03539 0.19645 0.72246 
0.00600 0.05000 0.50053 0.02503 0.13892 0.52601 
0.00900 0.05000 0.35357 0.01768 0.09813 0.38709 
0.01200 0.05000 0.24949 0.01247 0.06924 0.28897 
0.01500 0.05000 0.17586 0.00879 0.04881 0.21973 
0.01800 0.05000 0.12383 0.00619 0.03437 0.17092 
0.02100 0.05000 0.08710 0.00435 0.02417 0.13655 
0.02400 0.05000 0.06120 0.00306 0.01698 0.11238 
0.02700 0.05000 0.04295 0.00215 0.01192 0.09539 
0.03001 0.50000 0.03008 0.01504 0.08347 0.08347 
POSTERIOR RISK - 75/25 PRIOR [FIGURE 3] 
Prior Relative Posterior 
Possible Probability Probability Frequency Risk 
Population Of Error Of 0 Error Column 2 Of Prob. (of error 
Error Rate In In Sample X In rate than 
Rates Column 1 Of 115 Column 3 Column 4 Column 1) 
0.00000 0.75000 1.00000 0.75000 0.99007 1.00000 
0.03001 0.25000 0.03008 0.00752 0.00993 0.00993 
TABLE 7 
when it is favourable, and when it is unfavourable the impact is in the wrong 
direction. The simple posterior model suffers when the PPE is stacked on zero 
and materiality and the portion below materiality should be spread in what 
would amount to an unfavourable pattern. Since none of the simple models 
recognize the possibility of the actual underlying error being well in excess of 
materiality, it is not clear how the auditor would evaluate the results when a 
single material error is actually discovered. If a significant portion of the prior 
distribution actually extended beyond twice materiality, he could well be 
ignoring undetected error that still exceeded materiality. 
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POSTERIOR RISK - 25/75 PRIOR [FIGURE 4] 
Prior Relative Posterior 
Possible Probability Probability Frequency Risk 
Population Of Error Of 0 Error Column 2 Of Prob. (of error 
Error Rate In In Sample X In rate x than 
Rates Column 1 Of 115 Column 3 Column 4 Column 1) 
0.00000 0.25000 1.00000 0.25000 0.91724 1.00000 
0.03001 0.75000 0.03008 0.02256 0.08276 0.08276 
POSTERIOR RISK - 25/75 PRIOR [SPREAD - PEAKED AT MATERIALITY] 
Prior Relative Posterior 
Possible Probability Probability Frequency Risk 
Population Of Error Of 0 Error Column 2 Of Prob. (of error 
Error Rate In In Sample X In rate x than 
Rates Column 1 Of 115 Column 3 Column 4 Column 1) 
0.00000 0.01000 1.00000 0.01000 0.21967 i 1.00000 
0.00750 0.02000 0.42074 0.00841 0.18485 0.78033 
0.01500 0.04000 0.17586 0.00703 0.15453 0.59548 
0.02250 0.08000 0.07302 0.00584 0.12832 0.44095 
0.02999 0.10000 0.03015 0.00301 0.06623 0.31263 
0.03001 0.20000 0.03008 0.00602 0.13214 0.24640 
0.03600 0.25000 0.01475 0.00369 0.08102 i 0.11425 
0.04200 0.15000 0.00720 0.00108 0.02371 0.03324 
0.04800 0.10000 0.00349 0.00035 0.00767 0.00953 
0.05400 0.05000 0.00169 0.00008 0.00185 0.00185 
TABLE 8 
Some Interim Alternatives 
While I am tempted to suggest that auditors abandon their simple discrete 
models and use either an expanded discrete posterior model or a continuous 
posterior model, I recognize that in some quarters they still shoot the 
messenger who brings bad news (much larger substantive testing extents). In 
addition, some practitioners are of the view that the Bayesian approach is a 
"frame of mind'' and that anyone who would recommend its use must be "out 
of his mind." (With respect to this latter point, anyone who does not believe in 
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POSTERIOR RISK - 75/25 PRIOR [SPREAD - PEAKED AT MATERIALITY] 
Prior Relative Posterior 
Possible Probability Probability Frequency Risk 
Population Of Error Of 0 Error Column 2 Of Prob. (of error 
Error Rate In In Sample X In rate than 
Rates Column 1 Of 115 Column 3 Column 4 Column 1) 
0.00000 0.02000 1.00000 0.02000 0.15745 1.00000 
0.00500 0.05000 0.56189 0.02809 0.22117 0.84255 
0.01000 0.08000 0.31481 0.02518 0.19826 0.62138 
0.01500 0.10000 0.17586 0.01759 0.13844 0.42312 
0.02000 0.15000 0.09795 0.01469 0.11566 0.28468 
0.02500 0.22500 0.05439 0.01224 0.09634 0.16902 
0.02999 0.12500 0.03015 0.00377 0.02967 0.07268 
0.03001 0.12500 0.03008 0.00376 0.02960 0.04301 
0.03500 0.07500 0.01662 0.00125 0.00981 0.01341 
0.04000 0.05000 0.00915 0.00046 0.00360 0.00360 
POSTERIOR RISK - 75/25 PRIOR [SPREAD - PEAKED AT 0.5 MATERIALITY] 
Prior Relative Posterior 
Possible Probability Probability Frequency Risk 
Population Of Error Of 0 Error Column 2 Of Prob. (of error 
Error Rate In In Sample X In rate than 
Rates Column 1 Of 115 Column 3 Column 4 Column 1) 
0.00000 0.05000 1.00000 0.05000 0.26618 1.00000 
0.00500 0.07500 0.56189 0.04214 0.22435 0.73382 
0.01000 0.12500 0.31481 0.03935 0.20949 0.50947 
0.01500 0.17500 0.17586 0.03078 0.16384 0.29998 
0.02000 0.15000 0.09795 0.01469 0.07822 0.13614 
0.02500 0.10000 0.05439 0.00544 0.02896 0.05792 
0.02999 0.07500 0.03015 0.00226 0.01204 0.02897 
0.03001 0.02500 0.03008 0.00075 0.00400 0.01693 
0.03500 0.09000 0.01662 0.00150 0.00796 0.01293 
0.04000 0.07000 0.00915 0.00064 0.00341 0.00496 
0.04500 0.05000 0.00502 0.00025 0.00134 0.00155 
0.05000 0.01500 0.00274 0.00004 0.00022 0.00022 
TABLE 9 
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the Bayesian approach should be doing a constant amount of work on all audits 
regardless of how low or high inherent risk is assessed. I believe that the 
competitive environment will adequately deal with this problem when the PPE 
is favourable. As well, the increase in litigation resulting from significant audit 
failures will, no doubt, cause auditors to do more work when the PPE is 
unfavourable.) 
Cushing and Loebbecke (1983) suggest that the SAS 39 model not be used 
"when the auditor believes that the likelihood of material error is high." They 
suggest that some other model (unspecified) would be more appropriate in 
such circumstances. Given the foregoing illustrations of the failure of the SAS 
39 and 47 models when the prior risk of error is high, it is not difficult to agree 
with this suggestion. But the question remains as to what alternative the 
auditor has at the present time. He could throw up his hands in frustration and 
revert to "good old gut feel" until a reliable computerized Bayesian planning 
and evaluation model becomes available.* This would certainly not be a very 
progressive step. 
One interim solution might be to modify the discrete posterior model in an 
attempt to correct the deficiency resulting from the stacking of the prior 
probability of error on only two points. One approach that I am in the process of 
investigating involves using some fraction of materiality (such as ½ or 2/3) as the 
cut-off for the portion of the prior distribution that would be stacked on zero. 
The balance would be placed on materiality, resulting in a reduction of the 
allowable STD risk and, thus, requiring a larger sample. Although too early to 
judge, this approach might provide a workable procedure. 
Another interim solution would be to use an extended discrete model with 
the auditor actually specifying the prior distribution over reasonably short 
intervals (such as 10hs or 5ths of materiality). IC and AR could be integrated 
into the model by using the equivalent prior sample concept.5 This procedure 
involves inputting the values for IC and AR in terras of a sample size and a 
specific number of errors (this is very convenient because the parameters for 
the βeta distribution can be described in these terms and the βeta distribution 
can model audit priors in a very "realistic" manner). Such a model could be 
used for planning and evaluation, and it could be programmed for use on a 
micro-computer at a reasonable cost. 
When an auditor believes that a material error does not exist (low PPE), he 
collects evidence to support this belief. When he believes that a material error 
does exist (high PPE), he should attempt to prove that case rather than cross 
his fingers and hope he can prove that the situation is actually acceptable (this is 
why the posterior risk model requires a much larger substantive sample if the 
auditor wishes to "accept" when the PPE is high). The auditor can use the 
posterior risk model in another manner that would address the concerns 
expressed by Cushing and Loebbecke and also reduce the size of the 
substantive sample. This approach would require the auditor to change his 
outlook when the PPE is high. Instead of accepting the underlying population as 
* A quasi-Bayesian model purported to contain all of the desirable features of an audit risk model 
was recently described by McCray (1984). While this model may have some promise, it has not yet 
been subjected to a thorough analysis by the accounting and statistical professions. In addition, it 
has not been tested in a live audit environment. 
115 
being free of material error when he failed to detect it, he would search further 
because the result would be inconsistent with his expectation. Thus, he could 
start with a reduced sample extent and enlarge it if he failed to identify the 
expected error condition. The most common decision rule used in practice at the 
present time is just the opposite—start with a small sample and enlarge it only 
if errors are found. 
Researchers in practice and academe must be cognizant of the competitive 
environment. Understandably, client-handling partners of accounting firms will 
exhibit resistance to changes in the audit risk model if the result is more work. 
If they could be assured that their competitors were using the same model and 
achieving the same audit objective, I feel certain that they would not resist 
what we might all agree are "advances in theory and practice." However, we 
know that, in the "real world," even the simple models that we criticize are 
used by only a small minority of practitioners.* An impartial observer might be 
of the view that we are criticizing the Model T because more advanced models 
are available when, in fact, our profession is still in the horse and buggy era. 
Some Related Issues 
Even if we were to obtain complete agreement on the appropriate audit risk 
model, it would mean little if we could not achieve some degree of uniformity in 
materiality judgments. Audit risk by itself has absolutely no meaning. It can 
only be quantified and used in a model when it is related to a specified level of 
materiality.** In a forthcoming CICA Audit Research Study,6 I have recom­
mended that the profession solve this problem by providing users of financial 
statements with the level(s) of materiality used in the audit. 
Cushing and Loebbecke raised the issue of the aggregation of evidence 
throughout the audit and lamented the fact that "none of the sources cited in 
the literature review indicate how the model could be expanded to address the 
aggregation problem." Once again, they did not look very carefully at the 
literature they cited since Leslie et al (1979) described a methodology*** for 
aggregation that is consistent with paragraphs 27 to 32 of SAS 47. I believe that 
in the very near future this method of aggregation will be attacked in the 
literature as being without logic, statistical validity, or any other redeeming 
qualities. In this respect, one is reminded of the mid 1970s when almost 
everyone was attacking the validity of the Stringer bound. Several researchers 
recommended alternate bounds that generated much higher upper error limits. 
Now, of course, all of the literature in this area attacks the Stringer bound as 
being too inefficient because it is so conservative. A look into my crystal ball 
suggests that history is about to repeat itself. 
* This contention will be illustrated in a forthcoming AICPA Audit Research Monograph by Carl 
Warren. The basis of this monograph will be the 690 questionnaires submitted by 60 accounting 
firms as part of the Materiality and Audit Risk Task-force project. 
** Readers may have noticed that the final title of SAS 47 reversed the order of "risk" and 
"materiality" set out in the title of the Exposure Draft. This was the result of the mistaken belief 
of several members of the ASB that risk is determined before materiality and then used to 
determine the amount that is material. 
*** This method of aggregation, or a variation thereof, is used by Clarkson Gordon, Deloitte 
Haskins & Sells and several other firms. 
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The Role of Statistical Sampling 
in Compliance Testing 
"If there's no meaning in it," said the King, "that saves a world of trouble, you know, as 
we needn't try to find any.'' 
C.L. Dodgson 
The debate over the role of statistical sampling in auditing has spanned 
several decades. One segment of the profession holds the view that statistical 
sampling has no place in auditing since it results in a reduction in the use of 
judgment by the auditor. The other segment is of the view that without the use 
of quantitative methods the auditor has no reasonable method by which to 
determine testing extents. This latter segment also believes that the use of 
statistical sampling enhances the use of judgment in the audit process. 
Members of these two segments are now commonly referred to as "judgos" 
and "quantos," respectively. I make no attempt to hide the fact that I am a 
member of the "quanto" segment. 
Earlier in this paper, internal controls were identified as being either 
preventive or detective, and preventive internal controls were considered 
together with inherent risk in order to determine the prior probability of error. 
The preventive and detective distinctions are described in both the AICPA 
"Statements on Auditing Standards" and the CICA "Handbook." The latter 
includes the following description in paragraph 5205.13: 
Internal controls may be characterized as preventive or detective. Preventive 
controls are those which prevent, or minimize the chance of occurrence of, 
fraud and error. Detective controls do not prevent fraud and error but rather 
detect them, or maximize the chance of their detection, so that corrective 
action may be promptly taken. The known existence of detective controls may 
have a deterrent effect, and be preventive in that sense. 
It is reasonable to classify a detective control as a preventive control provided 
that detection will result in the recovery of the particular asset that would 
otherwise be lost to the entity. Prompt recognition (recording) of a loss by the 
entity would not qualify the control as one with preventive value. As an 
example, consider the earlier case of a large financial institution that holds large 
quantities of securities. If this institution could detect missing securities 
promptly and recover them, this control feature would serve as a preventive 
control since a dishonest (or potentially dishonest) employee would be 
reluctant to steal certificates if negotiating them exposed him to a high 
probability of being caught. On the other hand, if the institution could detect 
missing certificates promptly but do little to recover them, the control would be 
considered entirely detective since it would have no deterrent value. 
Certain types of control will be clearly preventive or detective in nature 
while others may be difficult to classify. In this respect, it is important to 
develop a decision rule for audit staff in order to avoid "classifications of 
convenience." 
Objectives of Compliance Testing 
In order to employ statistical sampling in compliance testing, the auditor 
must first establish the objective of his compliance tests. SAS Au § 320.59 
describes the purpose of compliance tests as follows: 
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The purpose of compliance tests is to provide reasonable assurance that 
the accounting control procedures are being applied as prescribed. Such 
tests are necessary if the prescribed procedures are to be relied on in 
determining the nature, timing, or extent of substantive tests of 
particular classes of transactions or balances, as discussed later . . . 
Other than the reference to "reasonable assurance," the above passage 
provides no guidance as to "how much compliance testing is enough." Of 
course, reasonable assurance (the complement of risk) must be related to 
"something" if it is to have any meaning. The "something" is described in 
paragraph 31 of SAS 39 (Au § 320.31) as '"the maximum rate of deviations from 
prescribed control procedures that would support his planned reliance." The 
subsequent discussion in paragraphs 32 to 42 of SAS 39 has, through the use of 
examples, established the internationally known and (ab)used "5 & 5 gets ya 
60" syndrome. This magic "60" is without a doubt the most commonly 
employed compliance testing extent in the world. If one is prepared to accept 
this number,* all of the problems related to compliance testing extents quickly 
vanish. 
Even though this approach would appear to have the blessing of a 
substantial portion of the profession (silence implies acceptance), it should not 
go unchallenged. SAS Au § 320.68 states: 
The auditor's evaluation of accounting control with reference to each 
significant class of transactions and related assets should be a conclu­
sion about whether the prescribed procedures and compliance there­
with are satisfactory for his purpose. The procedures and compliance 
should be considered satisfactory if the auditor's review and tests 
disclose no condition he believes to be a material weakness for his 
purpose. In this context, a material weakness is a condition in which the 
specific control procedures or the degree of compliance with them do 
not reduce to a relatively low level the risk that errors or irregularities 
in amounts that would be material in relation to the financial statements 
being audited may occur and not be detected within a timely period by 
employees in the normal course of performing their assigned functions. 
(emphasis added) 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine how the magic number "60" can 
meet the materiality criterion for every audit engagement. 
The following illustration demonstrates the variability in compliance testing 
payback when this approach is used. These calculations use the SAS 39 model 
(they ignore inherent risk for simplicity). AR is not effective and has been set 
equal to 1. In these cases, when the auditor takes his compliance sample of 60 
and finds no deviations, he subjectively determines that the IC risk is .25, and, 
using his risk equation, he increases his allowable sampling risk from a βeta of 
.05 to a βeta of .20. Columns (4) and (5) contain the DUS extents for each of 
the βeta risks based on the assumption that no errors will be found throughout 
the entire audit. In some instances, there is a positive payback, and in others it 
is negative. It can be seen that the payback is highly variable. But, suppose 
some of these populations are a part of the same audit engagement. Population 
2 is the western accounts receivable supervised by the credit office in Los 
* I suspect that Charles Dodgson would consider acceptance of a magic number of this nature as 
blind faith. 
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Angeles, population 3 is the eastern accounts receivable supervised by the 
credit office in New York, and population 4 is the Florida accounts receivable 
supervised by the credit office at the head office in Miami. Since all of the 
accounts are on the same computer and all of the systems are uniform, another 
auditor decides to compliance test the entire system as one and spreads his 
sample of 60 over the three locations. His payback is shown in case 5. Note 
that the net payback for 2, 3, and 4 is a sample reduction of 254, whereas for 
population 5 it is a reduction of 374. Is there any logic in the difference of 120 
between the two approaches? 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DUS For DUS For Internal Control 
Pop. 
No. 
Population 
Book Value 
Mate­
riality 
0 Errors 
and β= .05 
0 Errors 
and β = .20 
Payback 
(4)-(5)-60 
1 $ 1,000,000 $ 30,000 100 54 -14 
2 $10,000,000 $100,000 300 160 + 80} Net 
3 $20,000,000 $100,000 600 320 + 2 2 0 } » + 254 
4 $ 1,000,000 $100,000 30 16 -46} 
5 $31,000,000 $100,000 930 496 + 374 
6 $10,000,000 $300,000 100 54 -14} Net 
7 $20,000,000 $300,000 200 107 + 33} » - 36 
8 $ 1,000,000 $300,000 10 5 -55} 
9 $31,000,000 $300,000 310 166 + 84 
Now, along comes a bright young auditor, and she points out that the 
materiality level used was far too low based on various studies she has seen in 
the literature. A decision is made to increase materiality to $300,000. The 
impact of this decision is shown in cases 6 to 9. When the segments of the 
population are considered separately, there is a negative payback of 36 items. 
If they are considered "one" population, there is a positive payback of 84 
items. In either case, the level of materiality played an important role. 
However, the compliance testing guidance provided in SAS 39 provides no 
linkage to materiality. Clearly, a linkage is necessary. Consider this second 
case with materiality of $300,000 versus the first with materiality of $100,000. 
One would think that a system would have to work much harder to prevent or 
detect errors aggregating $100,000 than it would to prevent or detect errors 
aggregating $300,000. Thus, a higher tolerable rate of noncompliance should 
be acceptable for a materiality level of $300,000, resulting in a smaller sample. 
Unfortunately, this fact has been consistently ignored by most of the profession 
around the world. A fixed sample size of 60 (or any other magic number) cannot 
provide a linkage to materiality. 
In order to achieve this linkage, all the auditor need do is establish some 
reasonable relationship between the frequency of monetary errors and com­
pliance deviations. If such a relationship cannot be developed, then one must 
question the concept of relying on internal control in the first place. This 
concept is actually recognized in SAS 39 (paragraph 34): 
In assessing the tolerable rate of deviations, the auditor should consider 
that, while deviations from pertinent control procedures increase the 
risk of material errors in the accounting records, such deviations do not 
necessarily result in errors. For example, a recorded disbursement that 
does not show evidence of required approval may nevertheless be a 
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transaction that is properly authorized and recorded. Deviations would 
result in errors in the accounting records only if the deviations and the 
errors occurred on the same transactions. Deviations from pertinent 
control procedures at a given rate ordinarily would be expected to 
result in errors at a lower rate. 
As many researchers are aware, my associates and I have been expounding 
this approach for many years. When we first contemplated using the "5 & 5" 
fixed sample approach, our associate, Albert Teitlebaum of McGill University, 
pointed out the lack of logic and statistical consistency. It was his objective 
view from the sidelines, uncontaminated by the audit literature of the time 
(SAP 54), that forced us to see the illogical aspects of not relating the extent of 
compliance testing to materiality. In addition, whenever we attempted to 
incorporate the value for IC in a risk model, we found that it had to have a 
relationship to materiality in order to make any sense. The result was the 
"smoke/fire" methodology that we have described in two books and several 
papers.7 I hope that participants in this Symposium will focus some of their 
attention on this issue. 
Comparison of Value-Oriented and Neutral 
Sampling Methods for Compliance Tests 
The decision on the objective of compliance testing will impact the auditor's 
decision on method of sampling and, therefore, the method of selection. If the 
auditor subscribes to the magic number "60," he will more than likely use a 
neutral sampling method (all physical units will be given the same chance of 
selection—physical unit attribute sampling). A decision to relate compliance 
testing to materiality will generally result in the use of a value-oriented 
sampling method (DUS, CMA, PPS). The following is an example taken from 
the forthcoming CICA Audit Research Study on Materiality and from Leslie 
(1977). The sample of 257 is based on using a βeta risk of .20 and a three times 
multiple of materiality (see Leslie et al (1979) page 150). The sample of 95 is 
the magic number "60" expanded to allow acceptance of one compliance 
deviation without rejecting reliance on IC (consistent with the 257 calculation). 
Although the distribution in this illustration is hypothetical, it follows the 
shape of those found in actual accounting populations. This illustration demon­
strates the stark contrast between the selection methods and, perhaps, the 
importance of using value-oriented selection (where the maximum possible 
error in an item is related to its book value) regardless of the philosophy used 
to determine the sample size. 
In a number of research experiments carried out by the writer and others, 
groups of auditors have been requested to select samples from populations on a 
"judgmental representative" basis. Analysis of these samples revealed that 
the average judgmental allocation is very close to the V-O (DUS) average and 
in no way even resembles the neutral allocation. This is the reason why many 
auditors prefer to use judgmental value-oriented selection rather than physical-
unit attributes sampling in cases where they feel the cost of selecting a rigorous 
value-oriented probability sample (DUS) is not warranted by the added 
objectivity. When one envisages an auditor describing these two different 
approaches to an audit committee (or a judge), it is difficult to visualize any 
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Upper 
Stratum Number Stratum Average Sample Allocation 
boundary 
($000) 
of 
items 
value 
($000) 
n = 257 n = 95 
V-0 Neutral V-0 Neutral 
100 4 330 [ 3 { 1 
75 9 500 41 { 5 15{ 2 
50 31 1,100 { 11 3 { 4 1 
25 98 2,200 { 22 { 8 
20 154 2,700 27 3 10 1 
15 200 2,600 26 4 10 2 
10 357 2,500 25 7 9 3 
5 655 2,900 29 13 11 5 
4 795 2,700 27 16 10 6 
3 1,230 3,200 32 25 12 9 
2 1,360 1,900 19 27 7 10 
1 2,150 1,700 17 43 6 16 
.5 5,825 1,400 14 116 5 43 
12,868 25,730 257 257 95 95 
Average item value is $2,000 
V-O (257)—select 1 dollar unit out of every $100,000 on average. 
Neutral (257)—select 1 physical unit out of every 50.07 on average. 
V-O (95)—select 1 dollar unit out of every $270,526 on average. 
Neutral (95)—select 1 physical unit out of every 135.45 on average. 
support for the neutral approach since it concentrates on the small items and 
ignores the large ones. 
Sample Extension 
Kinney (1983) addresses the problem of the increasing risk when a sample 
is extended. He points out that, if a compliance sample of 60 is selected and a 
deviation is found, the auditor is not in a position to accept. On the other hand, 
if he had taken a sample of 95, he would have been able to tolerate one 
deviation. Thus, he selects another 35 items, and, if he finds no further 
deviations, he accepts. Kinney rightfully points out that in a strict statistical 
sense the auditor's risk will be in excess of the desired .05. 
This example serves to illustrate why Bayesian methods are required in all 
areas of auditing. Suppose in this example the auditor decided to extend his 
compliance test by 200 instead of 35. In accordance with strict statistical 
theory, the auditor's risk is still in excess of .05. But what if he extended by 
another 5,000 items and found no additional deviations? The statistical 
conclusion remains the same—-the risk is greater than .05 (but only very 
slightly). Now this does not seem very intuitive to the average auditor. He 
cannot imagine how he can have a sample of 5,060 with one deviation and be 
worse off than an auditor with a sample of 60 and no deviations. Of course, the 
auditor's intuition is correct. It is the statistical conclusion that is incorrect. 
This problem was first brought to our attention by Herbert Arkin in 1971. 
Needless to say, we found it very puzzling even though we could understand 
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the strict statistical conclusion. As reported by Teitlebaum (1973), the solution 
to this problem can be found in Bayesian analysis. For example, if a prior 
distribution of compliance deviation rates in a population is established 
(subjectively, of course—and it should be favourable or the auditor has no 
business considering reliance on IC) and then combined with the results of a 
compliance sample of 60 containing one deviation, a certain posterior distribu­
tion is produced. If this posterior distribution is then used as the prior 
distribution and combined with a deviation free sample of 35, the posterior 
distribution produced is identical to the posterior distribution produced by using 
the original prior and a sample of 95 with one compliance deviation. 
Thus, the auditor who employs Bayesian methods can ignore the issue of 
increasing risk when extending his samples. If his priors are favourable, his 
results will be acceptable. If his priors are unfavourable, deviation or error free 
results may not even be acceptable. This posture contrasts to that of the non-
Bayesian who will only react to sample results—with no recognition given to his 
prior beliefs. 
Much more extensive research in Bayesian methods and their application to 
auditing would be desirable. They are applicable to all areas of the attest audit. 
While prior probability distributions are subjective (and usually somewhat 
fuzzy) and cannot be "verified," they do and should reflect what the auditor 
actually believes. If he is prepared to "fudge" his priors in order to do less 
work, he knows when he concludes his audit that he really does not have the 
reasonable assurance he set out to obtain. He is then forced to live with his 
conscience. 
Is Compliance Testing Really Necessary in 
Order to Place Reliance on Internal Control? 
Based on auditing standards in Canada and the U.S., the answer would 
seem to be an obvious "yes." Perhaps it is time, however, to take another 
look at this requirement. It may well be that analysis of internal control results 
would be a far more useful and efficient approach than compliance testing in 
many situations. Consider the following three situations: 
(1) (2) (3) 
Inherent risk High High Low 
Preventive internal 
controls Excellent Poor Good 
Prior probability 
of error 
occurring Low High Low 
In case (2), the auditor identified detective internal controls and evaluated them 
as structurally sound. He would like to place reliance on these DICs in order to 
reduce his substantive test. Should he compliance test these key controls? 
Since the PPE is high, he expects a material error to occur (or there is a high 
probability that it will occur). It would seem logical that the first step should be 
an investigation of the errors detected by the DICs. If these controls did not 
find errors, he would have to question their effectiveness (and perhaps review 
the evidence supporting his decision relating to the high PPE). He might be 
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wise to ignore the DICs altogether and rely entirely on AR and STD for his 
assurance. 
If, on the other hand, the controls were detecting errors regularly and if 
these errors were being dealt with properly by management, would it still be 
necessary to compliance test the controls in order to place the planned reliance 
on them? It would seem to me that compliance testing should not be necessary. 
After all, the auditor would have discussed these controls with the employees 
responsible for their execution (when documenting them), traced a handful of 
different types of transaction through the key points in the system, and 
observed their effectiveness in detecting errors. Would compliance testing add 
anything in a situation of this nature? 
In cases (1) and (3), the auditor might well decide that the risk was low 
enough that any substantial reliance on DICs would not be warranted. He might 
already be prepared to use a risk of .20 for substantive work. An increase in 
this risk to, say, .37, as a result of reliance on DICs, would not have an 
adequate payback to warrant the compliance testing effort. He would then 
concentrate his efforts on AR and STD. He should, nonetheless, investigate 
the results obtained by any DICs. If they did detect significant errors, he would 
logically reconsider his PPE decision. 
With respect to PICs, the auditor would ignore them in both cases (2) and 
(3). In case (2), they do not help prevent error, and in case (3) his PPE 
evaluation would not change in their absence. In case (1), the auditor would 
carry out compliance verification procedures that would usually be observation 
oriented (segregation of duties, physical security, etc.), although in some cases 
audit trails would exist and compliance testing would be possible. If analysis of 
errors found by DICs and prior audits revealed that errors were not being 
prevented, no reliance would be taken for PICs. 
This compliance verification philosophy began to crystallize over the past 
few months while I analyzed the audit framework. If the concept is valid, 
implementation would help reduce audit costs by eliminating unnecessary 
compliance testing in many situations. 
Recommendations 
It has been demonstrated that the simple risk model set out in the Appendix 
to SAS 39 (and modified by SAS 47 to include the inherent risk factor) is not 
reliable and can seriously mislead auditors in the most dangerous situations 
they face. The Auditing Standards Board should give this model immediate 
attention. Simple risk models based on SAP 54 have served a useful purpose, 
but it is now time to take another step forward. Although the simple posterior 
model illustrated earlier is not perfect, I believe that it is more appropriate than 
the SAS 39/47 model. It would be a reasonable alternative until an "auditor 
friendly" continuous model is developed. Accordingly, I would recommend 
that the ASB withdraw the model in the Appendix to SAS 39 and replace it with 
the posterior model. 
An alternative to this recommendation would be to change the examples in 
the Appendix to SAS 39 to a .025 desired final audit risk so that a .50 inherent 
risk would provide the same final audit risk as the present .05 examples (that 
ignore inherent risk). This change would be accompanied by a caution 
informing users that, where the prior probability of error is high and evidence 
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of a material error is not detected by detective internal controls or the audit, 
the adequacy of the audit should be reconsidered. This admonition would 
require minor modifications to various SASs in order to explain the link 
between inherent risk and preventive internal controls (also required for the 
previous recommendation). 
SAS 39 has resulted in the undesirable adoption of a fixed compliance 
testing extent by a significant segment of the profession (in the U.S. and 
Canada). The ASB should review this outcome and either bless it or condemn 
it. If it decides to bless this approach, it should provide the logic that justifies a 
fixed sample size. In addition, some guidance as to how the auditor uses 
compliance testing results together with his assessment of the structure of 
internal control and materiality to determine the risk factor used in the equation 
would be welcomed by most of the profession. 
A Final Comment 
The focus of audit research over the past two decades has been primarily 
on quantitative techniques. It would not be unrealistic to state that technique 
development (statistical sampling, regression analysis, etc.) is leading practice 
by a wide margin. On another front, academics conducting behavioral research 
do not always receive a warm welcome from practitioners. It is to be hoped 
that practitioners will recognize the contribution that behavioral research can 
make to the advancement of the profession. The cooperation of practitioners is 
necessary for such research to be conducted properly and to provide the 
maximum benefits to the profession. More research on how auditors assess 
prior probabilities as well as how they should assess such probabilities would be 
useful. 
End Notes 
1. See for example, Power (1984). 
2. See for example, Leslie et al (1979), Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (1980), 
Kinney (1983), Cushing and Loebbecke (1983) and McCray (1984). 
3. See earlier quotation from paragragh 22 of SAS No. 47. 
4. Paragraph 21 of SAS 47 concludes with the sentence "These components of audit risk may 
be assessed in quantitative terms such as percentages or in nonquantitative terms that range, for 
example, from a minimum to a maximum." 
5. For more information on the equivalent prior sample (EPS) approach see Teitlebaum 
(1973), Felix (1976) and Leslie et al (1979, pp. 305-307). 
6. ''MATERIALITY—The Concept and Its Application To Auditing." This study should be 
released in late 1984 or early 1985. 
7. See for example, Leslie et al (1979), Anderson, R.J., (1977), and Leslie, D.A. (1977). 
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Appendix 
Comments of Ralph Walters (ex FASB board member—retired December 1983, formerly 
a senior partner with Touche Ross), extracted from a recent interview conducted by 
Professor Edward Stamp and published in a supplement to the International Accounting 
Bulletin, January 1984, entitled "Accounting Regulation in the U.S.: The Growing 
Debate." The supplement also contains interviews with Don Kirk, Robert Sprouse, Jim 
Leisenring, and Lee Seidler. 
I think when you become highly competitive as they have, and they have 
very strong growth instincts, they feel they have to grow; there's a tendency 
to lose sight sometimes of how you grow. I mean, grow all you want on the 
basis of better quality work, there's nothing wrong with that, but in their 
eagerness to grow they may have in some cases stooped a bit low. That's the 
impression we get here. 
If somebody is doing substandard work, cutting corners and isn't found out, 
you cannot upgrade the profession and upgrade the work. You know, there's a 
truism in auditing—it isn't whether you do a good audit or a bad audit that 
makes the difference, it's whether you get caught. That's all that counts. 
You could do a crummy audit and, as long as it never comes to light—and 
probably the chances are that in most cases it never will—everything's fine. 
You can do perfect audits and you're really in no better shape than the guy that 
did a bad audit and was never found out. 
Yet when you talk to individual CPAs, as I do quite a bit, they're a high-
minded group of people. They want to do what's right. Most of them have very 
strong professional instincts. I've never talked to anybody who was stealing 
somebody else's client or low-balling, but there's got to be somebody out 
there somewhere that's doing it. It needs leadership and it needs to be looked 
at as an extremely serious problem, because I maintain that, if accountants 
don't pull up their own socks, somebody's going to do it for them and they may 
do it in a fairly rough fashion. 
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